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How to Ensure Ethiopia’s ‘Jobs Compact’ Works for Refugees

Jordan’s ‘jobs-for-refugees’ compact, rolled out in 2016, saw mixed results. Five researchers from the Overseas Development Institute draw on lessons learned to recommend five ways to ensure the Ethiopia compact succeeds.

Written by Veronique Barbelet, Eva Ludi, Jessica Hagen-Zanker, Freddie Carver, Dirk Willem te Velde Published on Read time Approx. 6 minutes
Men prepare to distribute food aid from the World Food Programme at a warehouse at Bokolmanyo refugee camp in the Somali region of Ethiopia on December 19, 2017.ZACHARIAS ABUBEKER/AFP/Getty Images

Eighty-five percent of the global refugee population is hosted by low- and middle-income countries, many of which are also struggling to transform their economies and create sufficient jobs to keep up with demographic challenges. Refugee compacts – also known as “jobs compacts” or Economic Opportunities Programs – are a new policy model designed to address these two issues simultaneously.

These are agreements between donors and governments that host refugees. Using grants, concessional loans and other incentives, they aim to stimulate economic development and enable host countries to provide basic services to refugees and local populations.

First came the Jordan compact, rolled out in 2016. Among other policies, it committed the European Union to relaxing trade regulations to stimulate exports from 18 designated industrial parks in Jordan, in return for Jordan’s government providing employment quotas and work permits for Syrian refugees in these businesses. [Refugees Deeply documented the initiative’s mixed results in The Compact Experiment: Push for Refugee Jobs Confronts Reality of Jordan and Lebanon.]

The Ethiopia compact is the latest program. It has a strong focus on job creation for refugees and Ethiopians, with industrial parks (also known as “special economic zones” or SEZs) playing an important role. Our experts draw on lessons from Jordan and elsewhere to outline five ways that donors and Ethiopia’s government can ensure it succeeds.

Veronique Barbelet: Give Refugees Jobs They Actually Want

Ethiopia’s jobs compact is a great opportunity for refugees. It is also a great opportunity for governments in host countries, and their international humanitarian and development partners, to learn and improve from recent experiences.

Accessing jobs for refugees is a way out of aid dependency – but only if refugees are given the opportunity to do jobs they want that will improve their lives and livelihoods.

Jordan’s experience shows that jobs compacts only work if jobs match both the skills and the aspirations of refugees. This includes non-work-related aspirations such as family unity, or access to education for their children.

This is something we heard time and time again when researching the lives and livelihoods of Syrian refugees in Jordan. In Jordan, jobs in special economic zones were unattractive to refugees due to distance, work conditions, low pay and gender norms that prevented women taking on certain work opportunities.

Refugees also saw work permits as potentially more exploitative than conditions in the informal labor market. They tied refugees to employers, giving employers excessive power.

For Ethiopia’s jobs compact to work, the government should survey refugees’ aspirations and skills. This would help inform the type of work and therefore the type of interventions needed to support real economic opportunities for refugees.

Jessica Hagen-Zanker: Give Refugees Clear Information About Policies Designed to Support Them

Our research with refugees and other migrants has shown that very little information on government policy actually filters down to the people it is meant to target. This means it is less likely to achieve the desired impact.

For example, Syrian refugees in Jordan seemed unaware of even the most basic details of the Jordan compact, including sectors covered and the fact that work permits were subsidized in the first year. This contributed to low take-up.

Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia often lack accurate knowledge about the resettlement process, their eligibility status and the general likelihood of acceptance. This uncertainty keeps people waiting for months, and often years, foregoing the pursuit of alternative strategies that could make them better off in the short term.

For refugees and migrants to be able to make informed decisions about their options, information about the Ethiopia compact should be transparent and accessible. This includes information on eligibility, the conditions for participating and potential benefits for refugees.

It is also important to think about how to communicate this information. People use trusted information to make their decisions, drawn from their social networks. Governments and donors should communicate through organizations that have trusted relationships with refugees, including refugee organizations, community-based organizations and influential local actors such as faith-based groups.

Eva Ludi: Ensure Job Schemes Don’t Cause Conflict With Local Populations

Ethiopia’s compact promises employment for 30,000 refugees. It is meant to create opportunities for refugees to live a normal life and reduce the pressure for onward migration, as well as contribute to Ethiopia’s economic development.

But it also has its risks. Existing and planned industrial parks are all located along important transport routes and close to major urban centers. But refugees are currently hosted in more peripheral areas – usually along borders with neighboring countries. To take up these jobs, refugees need to be supported to leave the camps and settle near these industrial parks.

Resettling large numbers of refugees may lead to increased tensions with the local population also hoping to access newly created jobs. Unemployment (and underemployment) and landlessness are growing problems in Ethiopia: a source of considerable discontent among young people who have invested in their education with a view of moving out of agriculture into manufacturing or service jobs. Many flock to these same rapidly growing urban centers.

Ensuring that resettled refugees have decent living standards and are protected from the risk of exploitation will also place an additional burden on already overstretched municipalities to provide housing and services including education, health, energy and transport.

Balancing the needs and aspirations of both refugees and local populations for newly created jobs in industrial parks will need careful consideration and management. Key to this is making selection criteria for job applicants fair and transparent and employment conditions equal for both groups, while at the same time protecting the status of refugees.

Freddie Carver: Give Refugees Genuine Pathways to Self-Reliance

The jobs compact in Ethiopia aims to increase employment opportunities available to refugees while ensuring their protection needs continue to be met: This is a challenging balance to strike.

Top-down job creation schemes like industrial parks become an attractive option, offering refugees reliable work within a controlled environment, reducing the political challenges that may be posed by greater levels of internal mobility.

But if this is the only real choice offered, there is a risk that refugees end up trapped in a situation no better than a camp, with their dependency merely transferred from the United Nations to their new employer.

If refugees have moved to a part of the country where they have fewer bonds of kinship with the surrounding populations, then they may find themselves with even fewer alternative means of support if their new job doesn’t meet all their needs.

The Ethiopian government and their international partners must therefore treat all of the government’s pledges announced at the 2016 U.N. summit on refugees and migrants as an interlinked package.

The provision of jobs alongside implementation of the other pledges – providing greater access to education, giving greater clarity on what local integration might look like and creating a stronger legal framework – could create a genuine pathway for refugees to become self-reliant and confident in their rights.

But this will require policymakers to develop a more coherent approach to the different strands of reform. All parts of the Ethiopian government involved – those responsible for refugees, those developing industrial parks, those in charge of the regions hosting refugees – should come together to set out a clearer common vision.

Without this coherent vision, there is a risk that the support provided by Ethiopia’s international partners will be fragmented and fail to meet the opportunity presented for both refugees and hosting populations.

Dirk Willem te Velde: Support Job Schemes With Broader Industrial Strategies

Ethiopia is rightly focusing on industrial parks to support industrialization. Hawassa Industrial Park is a recent example, creating more than 20,000 jobs within a year. Many more parks are currently being built.

These industrial parks – Ethiopia’s term for special economic zones – are critical policy tools that can help a country transform its economy and create jobs (including potentially for refugees, directly or indirectly). But it takes time and lots of deliberate action to get them right.

SEZs that have successfully supported a country’s economic transformation can be found in China (such as Shenzhen), Singapore (Jurong), Malaysia (Penang) and Ireland (Shannon).

Africa has seen more mixed results: Some zones were in weakly connected locations; some targeted the wrong sectors; some contained very different and unconnected firms, meaning firms did not benefit from spillover effects through linkages and clustering among firms. Some failed to link with the local economy, or were not supported by effective industrial strategies.

Successful zones require upfront investment in specialized infrastructure, but also, over time, complementary investment promotion activities, programs developing links with the rest of the economy, and overall strategies focusing on skills and technological development.

Our analysis suggests that transformation succeeds only by combining such targeted support with a broader enabling environment.

Policymakers must also continually learn and adjust what’s not working. This can take time – but it’s worth remembering that it took 5–10 years before Jurong Island’s economic zone in Singapore and Shannon Free Trade Zone in Ireland generated net benefits for the country.

A version of this article was originally published by the Overseas Development Institute.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Refugees Deeply.

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