The group’s latest findings come as nearly one dozen powerful Syrian rebel factions, including one linked to al-Qaida, broke with the main opposition group and called for Islamic law in the country, a major blow for the coalition.

“The announcement was really a representation of the failure of the West or any other countries to provide the armed opposition with any viable means of support, other than private donors from Qatar, Saudi, whoever they’re into that day,” said SCM’s founder, an Istanbul-based American who wished to remain anonymous.

“Because of their need for private donor money and giving up on getting aid from the West, these groups’ rhetoric has changed, and the numbers show that. Formations are no longer talking about the FSA, and they’re talking about Islam and using Islamic paraphernalia and flags and the like. Of course this was coming, it was just a matter of when.”

He called attention to a series of June Al Jazeera interviews with the four largest groups in the Islamic Alliance. “They all said that the Quran was the new source of legislation and they said that the opposition [leaders based] outside Syria don’t represent them. But it remains to be seen if [the split] will have any results on the ground. In the end it will come back to money,” i.e., which groups have it and which groups need it, “because that seems to be driving most of what happens on the ground.”

Here are the three key things we learned from SCM’s latest data about the changing dynamics of fractious rebel fighting groups.

Since the beginning of 2013, nearly one in three videos Syria-wide has invoked Islamic rhetoric as justification for the fight against the regime.

“The nationwide declines in FSA affiliation among armed groups coincides with noticeable increases in the appearance of Islamist and religious rhetoric across Syria,” SCM said.

“In addition to the aforementioned failures of any alternative galvanizing force or concept, the consistent tactical, financial and symbolic success of religiously motivated armed groups is undeniably driving a growing number of armed groups to adopt similar rhetoric and shifting the tone of the conflict. It must be reiterated that these categories are not monolithic. Groups employing Islamist rhetoric or religious symbols may differ greatly from one another. Additionally, there may be a sizable number of groups that subscribe to political-religious ideologies that do not introduce such rhetoric or symbols into their formation videos for a variety of reasons.”

Since 2012, slightly less than one-fifth of groups publishing information videos on YouTube declare affiliation with the U.S.-backed Free Syrian Army. 

“Affiliating with or invoking the FSA brand in unit formation videos has significantly declined since 2012. The FSA label, with few exceptions, does not reflect real command and control or unit integration into a larger fighting group known as the FSA,” SCM said.

“Instead, the FSA label was traditionally invoked as a symbol of national solidarity with other fighting units. Based on the significant decline in FSA branding among formation videos, it is reasonable to conclude that the FSA label is no longer a symbol of unity between armed opposition groups. The FSA label in the context of formation is now likely a reminder of repeated failed attempts by figures outside of Syria to unite the armed opposition nationwide under the banner of the FSA.”

Within armed groups, there is a significant trend from military to civilian leadership. 

For the first time beginning in the period of January to April 2013, a majority of videos in which declarations of leadership were made on camera were led by civilians.

“As the total number of fighting groups has increased, so too has the trend towards civilian control,” the group said. “This may reflect the insufficient number of available defected military officers to command opposition units and/or the growing aptitude of civilians to command units after two years of fighting.”

It said that civilian command of armed opposition units “carries important implications for armed group behavior … civilian command may blur the distinction between civilian and military structures on the ground, with many individuals assuming roles in local civilian governance structures in addition to armed units.”

It also said that “the decline and potential marginalization of officers in relation to civilian commanders among armed opposition groups may also reflect and contribute to the changing rhetoric in the conflict. At the outset of the conflict, officers were symbols of national resistance and spoke in nationalist political terms. The perceived failures of these officers and the rise of prominent civilian commanders who spoke in more religious and at times sectarian terms may work to increasingly sideline symbols of national integration such as defected military officers.”